Associate Professor of Finance
Wisconsin School of Business
Research interest: Financial intermediation, Decentralized Trading, Search and matching
Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic trading framework that determines jointly agents' counterparties as part of the equilibrium, instead of assuming that agents match exogenously. We show that because of limited information in the decentralized market, the roles of market makers or customers emerge endogenously: certain agents specialize in market making and become highly interconnected, forming the core of the financial network. Having a model with endogenous trading links and transaction prices allows us to show that such a highly asymmetric market structure is constrained efficient, as market makers are compensated correctly for their services. It also allows us to obtain new insights regarding market resilience and intermediation costs.
Abstract: We analyze the impact of a regulatory reform in a novel framework that jointly determines banks’ bilateral networks and platform access. In our model, banks use their bilateral connections to obtain indirect access to the platform, which saves direct entry costs but results in risk concentration. This trade-off leads to a unique market structure, which is generally asymmetric with multiple layers even if all banks are ex ante homogeneous. Policies that increase balance sheet costs relative to entry costs could result in a more symmetric market structure but have ambiguous effects on transaction costs. Our results underscore that policies aiming to achieve all-to-all trading, reduce risk concentration, or lower transaction costs can be counterproductive.